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Nation-State Hacking:
Uniting Policy and Code to Limit
the Threat

countries rush to bolster defenses2 and create newer,
more effective attacks. Nation-states may hide attacks
amongst a myriad of independent hacking organizations and may even mimic attacks used by indeMark M. Deen, Florida International University pendent hacking organizations. All of the preceding
factors make it extremely difficult to forensically differentiate between an attack from a nation-state and
an attack from an independent hacking organization.3 To further complicate this, some nation-states
Abstract
may use independent hacking organizations to assist
This article examines nation-state hacking and ana- in attacks against other nations. The most predomilyzes some possible defenses against these attacks by nant use of nation-state hacking is to resolve conflict
combining policy and code level defense. The article and policy disputes in the cyber arena rather than the
examines some recent incidents of nation-state hack- political arena. This article aims to examine the mething and evaluates the actions taken by the attacker ods nations may use to defend against these threats.
and the effected parties. This work focuses on a variety
Historical Context
of nation-state hacking incidents and provides a critical perspective on how policy and code level controls In 2007, a piece of malicious computer code called
could be combined to defend against these attacks. Stuxnet was used to disrupt the Iranian nuclear proNation-state hacking continues to be an important is- gram.4 Stuxnet succeeded in slowing Iranian progress
sue on the United States security agenda. Advanced in their nuclear program by severely damaging the
nation-state hacking threats can adversely affect the centrifuges by causing them to spin out of control
day to day operations of a nation effectively crippling while monitoring systems reported normal centriit with nearly complete anonymity. In 2013, the U.S. fuge operation.5 Stuxnet was the first tangible eviissued E.O. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cy- dence that nation-state level hacking was being used
bersecurity. On December 1, 2016, President Obama actively to alter international policies and politics.
unveiled the National Cybersecurity Plan to increase
attacked several US compaawareness of the threat that lack of appropriate cy- In 2009, China allegedly
6
nies including Google and RSA.7 The Chinese attack
bersecurity controls presents.
escalated in 2014 when China allegedly hacked the
United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
network and obtained the OPM database, which conNation-state hacking is an important issue on the
tains information about more than 4 million current
United States security agenda. Nation-state hacking
and former federal government employees.8
is defined as an attack or series of attacks conducted by one nation-state against another nation-state In 2014, North Korea purportedly attacked the comto defend national sovereignty and project national puter systems of Sony Pictures Entertainment.9 The
power.1 Nation-state hacking may provide access to North Korean attack significantly disrupted the netinformation that may take years or decades to access work operations of Sony Pictures and affected cuswith traditional methods such as the use of spies or tomers around the globe. The North Korean attack
surveillance techniques and in the twenty-first centu- was rumored to be a result of a Sony Pictures planned
ry has replaced the spy as the most effective and effi- release of a movie concerning the North Korean Prescient method to access secure information with little ident.
risk and significant reward.
Later that year, Russia allegedly launched an attack
The organizations creating nation-state malware are that compromised the United States State Departtypically well-funded, well-trained, and dedicated to ment and the White House. The attack permitted the
achieving their hacking objectives. While these team attackers to access non-classified information includmembers remain safe in a remote location their ma- ing information concerning the President in the form
licious code may travel deep within highly secured of emails and the President’s daily schedule.10
networks and systems thousands of miles away. Nation-state hacking represents a new arms race as The outcome of these attacks was that for a period
of time foreign nation-state sponsored organizations
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had access to sensitive information within the United States government or U.S.-based companies. The
policy response from the United States government
was swift and decisive. In 2013, the administration
issued E.O. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity which defined the need for Information
Security concerns to be addressed on a national level.11 In February 2014, the United States government
released a Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity which provided guidance focused
on protecting critical infrastructure organizations
from attacks.12 The most recent iteration in U.S. policy concerning cybersecurity is the December 1, 2016
Report on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy
issued by the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. The report calls for a greater investment
in cybersecurity mechanisms13 and provides some
actionable steps for organizations seeking to protect
themselves from cyber-attacks.

Policy And Why It Matters
All of the nation-state attacks involved the introduction of malicious code into trusted computer systems.
In most cases the malicious code was introduced either
by human interaction or previously unknown flaws in
the configuration of effected systems. The absence of
defined policy results in diversity within human processes and procedures. In turn, this leads to diversity
in the configuration of computing systems which creates weaknesses that may be exploited to gain access
to computing systems—often with increased levels
of system permissions. The application of well-defined and sound policies minimizes the threat posed
by inconsistent computing system configurations by
employing general rules that should be applied to all
computing systems. An excellent example of policy
is the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. The NIST Cybersecurity
Framework was developed in direct response to E.O.
13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
and provides a framework to measure and enhance
cybersecurity mechanisms in order to protect government and private sector organizations. The NIST
framework provides a series of granular controls that
address network configuration, connectivity, and Information Technology practices. However, the NIST
framework provides very little guidance regarding
code level security. NIST does however provide excellent guidance regarding human processes such as Information Technology change management practices. In the case of StuxNet simple human policy rules

regarding system patching, system security monitoring, and the use of USB thumb drives could have
been useful in limiting the threat StuxNet presented.
Another example of policy and its effect in guiding Information Security practices is the European Union’s
May 17th release of the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The NIS Directive provides a uniform
approach to securing information systems between
European Union (EU) member states. The NIS Directive recognizes that cybercrime may cross national
boundaries and facilitates cross border coordination
between EU member states during the investigation
of cybercrime. NIS requires that specific security controls are enabled where personal information concerning European Union citizens is being stored. The
implementation of the NIS directive fundamentally
affects the way that EU and non-EU organizations interact. The NIS requirement to add additional security
layers around EU citizen’s information requires many
organizations to alter the way they address Information security practices for data stored both inside and
outside the EU. The EU directives stresses the need for
sound information security practices such as encryption, secure destruction, and accountability for data.
However, it provides little information about programming code used to store and manipulate data.
Overall, neither the EU NIS Directives nor the Report
on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy issued
by the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity address the concerns pertaining to code or
strong coding standards for security. Nation-state
hacking relies on poor code controls as well as a lack
of policies that govern human behavior. Many of the
policies are concentrated on the activities of humans
and are not focused on activities performed in an automated manner by computer systems executing the
commands stored in programming code.

Code And Why It Matters
At the most elemental level of computing systems,
sequences of commands are contained in scripts
referred to as code. The individual instructions contained within the code are then executed by the
computer system. Because computers simply execute the instructions contained within code they
cannot differentiate between malicious and benign
instructions. Anti-virus and anti-malware tools are a
means of restricting the execution of malicious code
on computing systems. Anti-virus and anti-malware
tools are based on known “signatures” of malicious
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code and are therefore incapable of alerting system used to compromise sensitive information.
users concerning the possible threat presented by
code for which signatures do not exist. Anti-virus and Conclusion:
anti-malware software cannot defend computing sys- Combining Code And Policy
tems completely due to the signature based nature of Current national cybersecurity policies focus on retheir operation.
stricting electronic access to networked computer
systems but do not address the need to protect comThe majority of nation-state hacking incidents reputer systems at the code level despite the fact that
quired the execution of malicious code on effected
this method is used by most nation-state attacks. Polisystems in order to facilitate an effective attack. In the
cies should also consider possible efficiencies by addcase of StuxNet the malicious code entered the Iraniing requirements for code level controls to limit the
an nuclear facility on a USB thumb drive.14 The code
stored on the USB drive spread rapidly through the threat presented by nation-state level hacking. The
facility and around the world by exploiting a previ- combination of policy level guidance and code level
ously unknown flaw in the Microsoft Windows oper- controls would serve to decrease the opportunity for
malicious code to enter into computer systems and
ating system.
adversely impact the operation of those systems. NaCode level controls such as code whitelisting may tional cybersecurity policy should also clearly address
limit the capabilities of malicious code.15 Whitelisting the ability for code to communicate from within the
is a process that permits computers to only execute network to outside parties. By blocking the ability for
code that is approved. Enacting policies requiring code to communicate outside of secured computer
that only whitelist approved code may operate on networks the ability to remotely control or send incomputing systems decreases the probability that formation from compromised computer systems is
malicious code may be able to run on these comput- disabled.
er systems.16 Whitelisting is a supplementary control
to existing anti-virus and anti-malware solutions and Nation-state hacking will increase in the future as it is
should be used in addition to these software counter- fundamentally a part of warfare. Protecting as many
key infrastructure computer systems as possible is an
measures.
effective method to limiting the threats presented
Furthermore, code is also contained in hardware by nation-state attacks. The human element may be
components. The code in hardware components in- controlled by effective policies and practices but ulform the computer how to communicate with the timately the code and instructions executed by comhardware component and is referred to as “firmware”. puting systems will define whether or not an attack is
Firmware code is stored in chips on the hardware com- effective.
ponent and is always present regardless of whether
or not a computer system has been restarted or reset. National policy should be expanded to address code
Firmware code executes within the hardware device level controls and provide some guidance on how to
and may not be visible to malicious code scanning implement these controls to create a complete aptools such as anti-virus and anti-malware software in- proach to securing national cybersecurity. Furtherstalled on the computer system. Currently, very few more, national policy should provide simple guidsolutions exist to validate the code stored in firm- ance regarding technologies such as whitelisting as
ware, but methods such as code signing, code valida- a method to limit the capability for malicious code to
tion, and independent code testing serve to validate execute on computer systems and as a supplementhe authenticity of firmware code. On September 6, tary control for anti-virus and anti-malware software.
2016, the United States Computer Emergency Read- Finally, the threat presented by malicious firmware
iness Team (CERT) issued advisory TA16-250 which stored on chips inside of computer systems and grey
discusses the threat presented by firmware executing market devices should also be escalated as a risk in
within “grey market” devices.17 Grey market devices the national cybersecurity policy. There is a unique
are devices such as network switches and routers that challenge to validate and verify the authenticity of
are resold on the secondary market by parties other firmware since it may not be removed without disthan the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). abling the hardware device. This provides a perfect
Gray market devices may have been tampered with platform for nation-state attacks to hide and operate
or have malicious firmware installed that may also be with little risk of detection.
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